Modernity/Postmodernity

Kant, Immanuel. (1784). An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment? Retrieved 1/11/10 from http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant/html.

Hamilton P. (1996). The Enlightenment and the birth of social science. In S. Hall, D. Held, D. Hubert, K. Thompson (Eds.), Modernity: An introduction to modern societies (pp. 20-54). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, S. (1996). On postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall. In D. Morley & K. Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (pp.131-150). London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1992). Contingent foundations. In J. Butler & J. Scott (Eds.), Feminists theorize the political (pp.3-21). London: Routledge.

McDonald, M. (2002). Queering whiteness: The peculiar case of the Women’s National Basketball Association. Sociological Perspectives, 45, 379-396.

This week’s readings covered a range of themes, both historically and conceptually, from the Enlightenment, through modernity, to postmodernity. In this initial post, to help spur discussion, I try to map the arguments from Kant to Buter--via Hamilton, Hall, and McDonald--so as to tie the readings together, and provoke questions along the way.

To begin, the emergence of sociology as a field of study (and, eventually cultural studies), was the result, in part, of Enlightenment thinking. As Kant (1784) argued at the time, the central paradigm of the Enlightenment was to allow the free thinking man [sic] to emerge from a self-imposed immaturity. Kant saw man as shackled and confined by rules and formulas--i.e. the church, physicians, nobility--that prevented him from free, rational, and scientific thought. Kant, like other philosophes, saw the Enlightenment as a gradual, but inevitable process that could not be achieved through a coup d’état, but rather, through a revolution of the mind. Only through individual free thought could the unthinking masses be emancipated (Kant, 1784).

As Hamilton (1996) outlines, the “birth of sociology” can be traced to Enlightenment thinkers--primarily Henri de Saint-Simon, and Auguste Comte. These Enlightenment thinkers sought to construct a “positive science” of society that would be based on critical rationalism and apply reason to social, political and economic issues. The new field of social science would concern itself with progress, emancipation, and improvement. Essentially it sought to build upon the works of previous generations of pilosophes to continue enlightened thinking. The Enlightenment became tied to the idea of modernity as society was thought of as something over and above the individual. It was through the social that progress, science, and rational thought--ideologies that would later be symbolized by the American and French Revolutions--would bring about the modern free man.

Hamilton (1996) argues that the Enlightenment was not only the precursor to modernity, but rather, the pursuit of it. He argues that the Enlightenment involved characteristically sociological concerns about how societies are organized and developed, and that philosophes saw an essential uniformity in human nature (an issues that post-modern scholars would go on to challenge as both Hall (1996) and Butler (1992) note). This brings me to the question that if, as Hamilton discusses, the Enlightenment was localized to Western Europe in the 18^th Century (Hall also calls modernism a “western phenomenon”), how does this idea of the Enlightenment as the pursuit of modernity serve to ignore the other forms of modernity in other parts of the globe (the global South for example), and privilege this western, linear version of history over others?

Now, in the little space that I have left, I would like to get to the issue of postmodernity. Both Hall (1996) and Butler (1992) present what they see as the central facets of postmodernism, yet they both question what we mean when using the term postmodern. Hall (1996) argues that postmodernity holds two charges. First, there is nothing of significance but modern culture, and there are no contradictory forces to it. Second, these changes are profound and we have no choice but to reconcile ourselves to them. Similarly, Butler (1992) argues that a number of positions are attached to postmodernity: discourse is all there is; the subject is dead; ‘I’ can never be used; and there is no reality, only representations (p.4). While Hall and Butler are similar in this regard, I think they differ in how they view the usefulness of postmodernity. Both discuss how postmodernist thought involves the “collapse of the real” as a dominant type of representation into fragmented forms. Hall argues that we cannot conceptualize language without meaning, representation, ideology. He takes issues with two “postmodern” scholars, questioning Baudrillard’s argument that we are at the end of signifying practice, and Foucault’s use of the discursive without an ideological dimension.

Where Hall sees these issues as problematic, Butler takes another position. She argues that the project of postmodernism is to call into question the ways in which paradigms--the set of interconnected ideas that provide an image of the world and a way of thinking about it--oppress and erase that which they seek to explain. While Hall challenges the notion of a break between modernism and postmodernism, is it perhaps here where this rupture becomes visible? Philosophes saw a universality to human knowledge and people: postmodern scholars (a grouping to which Butler has been attach) challenge this notion of universality. Butler (1992) questions how a theory or politics can be grounded in a position which is “universal” when the very category depends on ethnocentric biases based on exclusion and difference.

I think that this brings back the question of positionality discussed last week. From a postmodern perspective that operates against totalizing notions, and seeks to renegotiate subjectivity, can there ever be a true subjectivity? Or are subjects always fragmented and require deconstruction? How do we account for a multiplicity of positions? Do we agree with Hall that postmodernity is limiting in that it closes off history and assumes that there is no future, only the present? Or, do we see postmodernity as providing new avenues for critiques by challenging hegemonic practices and ideologies through “postmodern” approaches like queer theory, as McDonald (2002) argues?

Cultural Studies as Method

Johnson, R., Chambers, D., Raghuram, P., Tincknell, E. (Eds) (2006). The practice of cultural studies (1-103). London: Sage.

Slack, J. (1996). The theory and method of articulation in cultural studies. In D. Morley and K. Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (112-127). London: Routledge.

King, Samantha. (2005). Methodological contingencies in sports studies. In D. Andrews, D. Mason, & M. Silk (Eds.), Qualitative Methods in Sport Studies. Oxford: Berg

Brundson, C., Johnson, C., Moseley, R. & Wheatley, H. (2001). Factual entertainment on British television: The Midlands TV Research Group’s ‘8-9 Project’. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 4-9.

It is not surprising that since cultural studies draws on diverse subject areas it would also draw on a variety of methods and methodologies for conducting its research. This week the focus of the readings is on the methods, methodologies and theories employed in cultural studies research. Through the readings it became evident that research in cultural studies is very different from the scientific, empirically focused research that I am familiar with. As such, I have discovered many aspects of cultural studies research that I am excited to learn and apply, for example: it addresses power, it avoids reductionism, and it is reflexive. However, I am still confused and questioning the application of cultural studies research “methods”.

I will start my discussion on a positive note, discussing two key themes that appeared throughout the readings; that of power and positionality and reflexivity of the researcher. We learn in cultural studies to consider how power and positionality as a researcher influence our work. However, I only ever thought of my position and the power I bring within the context of interviewing my participants. I did not think about the existence of power throughout the different “moments” of research. I will use the cultural circuit (Johnson et al., 2006) as a guide to explore power at the different stages of producing research. As previously mentioned, a power relationship exists when interviewing participants at the “everyday life phase”, at the production phase, power exists in the interpretation of the data and choosing what to include, deciding on the sources/references and then at the text phase there is power in deciding what to write (Johnson et al., 2006). I introduce the topic of power as it is key component of reflexivity. Reflexivity is described as “knowing thyself” or self-awareness (Johnson et al., 2006) and it is essential to cultural studies research. Reflexivity is an on-going dialogue that not only involves thinking about ourselves, our biases, our expectations, our thoughts and feelings and our work within the research, but also how we feel in the world around us and being ready and willing to make changes. However, as Johnson et al. (2006) state, reflexivity is not a confessional so it makes me wonder, how much reflexivity do we include in our research? How do we know what is enough, or too much?

Johnson et al. (2006) discuss “truth claims” and state that in cultural studies three methodologies are used to legitimize the claims that are made in research, empirical (such as field work), interpretative (hermeneutics) and critical (praxis). These theoretical approaches as well as the approach “concept-led” are represented in a schematic on page 97. According to Johnson et al. (2006) cultural studies draws from all of these approaches, but does it favour some approaches over others? Does a study lose credibility if it relies more on one approach than another? It seems that cultural studies favours theory over practice and abstraction over empirical analysis. I am aware that cultural studies is fluid and believes that dyads should not exist and that empirical and abstract theories or analysis are both necessary, but would a practice-based, field study, still be considered part of cultural studies?

I grapple with the idea that cultural studies has no single or concrete means of methodology and that methods can be theories and vice versa. According to Johnson et al. (2006) the word “research practice” is favoured over methods or methodologies for cultural studies as they feel it better describes the active process of cultural studies research. Slack (1996) states that methods become a process that need to be adapted as we progress through research, so does this mean we are continually re-evaluating and changing the methods throughout our research projects? If methods are so undefined, what are the determining factors that allow research to be part of cultural studies? As long as research involves power, emancipation, context, hegemony etc., is it considered part of cultural studies?

Finally, I am almost out of space but did not feel I could end the blog without addressing articulation. Through articulation, I have gained greater insight into how a concept can be both a theory and a method. As theory, articulation is used to describe social formations and as a methodological framework, it provides strategies for doing cultural studies. Articulation is the process involved in the joining of parts, it provides a way of creating links between concepts that may not normally be joined or that may be seen as mutually exclusive (Slack, 1996, King, 2005). I realize from King’s (2005) article that articulation is a key method used by cultural studies researchers when looking at sport because it provides the social, economic and political context. Although not addressing sport, the Brunsdon et al. (2001) article was very helpful as it gave concrete examples of articulation in the research practice of textual analysis. The article shows how tensions that are normally mutually exclusive exist. In the Jamie Oliver example, there are “competing discourses of masculinity” (39). My understanding of this competing discourse is that Jamie Oliver is a man in his own kitchen cooking on television, and these elements at one time did not all come together. I don’t have room to expand, so I apologize for my rather crude explanation, but if you are uninspired to address my comments or questions, perhaps you’d like to elaborate on Brunson et al.’s (2001) use of articulation.

From Beamish to King, Leaving Marx behind?

Part II:

Readings: Hall and Hargreaves and McDonald

Both authors attempt to answer the complex question of what constitutes “cultural studies.” Hargreaves and McDonald take the example of sport to illustrate the complexities of everyday life (sporting) as intersecting with greater social, political and cultural forces. Hall’s piece, an older perspective, attempts to define this through contrasting Cultural Studies with Functionalist Sociology.

This last distinction is what struck me, and as a self-proclaimed Sociologist I felt I should focus on this aspect of these readings.

These approaches demonstrate the difficulty in defining a discipline that openly resists reductionism. Cultural Studies, by its very nature, can be “…dissolved in further methodological and theoretical reprise” when concrete constructions are attempted (Hall 1980:39). Studies with this ‘cultural’ orientation (both Sociology and Cultural Studies) necessitate fluidity in definition; this, to me, resonates with a postmodern perspective. It is through this allocation that I wish to pose that these disciplines (Sociology and Cultural Studies) are united by common themes. The grand narratives of older theorists (such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim) though foundational, are also the roots of critique, and that binaries such as man/woman, straight/queer, healthy/unhealthy and able/disabled are seen as problematic in themselves; and that these loaded linguistic assignments must be taken apart to determine true signification, in other words who these distinctions are meant for and how they operate on these individuals. It is through these critical lenses that ‘reality’ is seen as far more complex than simply consisting of the sign and the signified. This is identified as the modern linguistic turn and further the advent of Foucauldian sentiments “…In his notion of ‘discourse’” modern social and cultural theorists seem to advance towards the same goals of breaking down both “dichotomy” and “…the signifying (‘discursive’) and the ‘extra-discursive’ aspects of any practice” (Hall 1980:37). Our social world cannot be ‘measured’ not in any objective sense; we cannot sit external to the society/culture in which we live.

The divisions between theory and praxis are meant to articulate as a further distinction between Cultural Studies and the rest. This is where, at least, I believe, the sporting body enters. Sport is a visceral lived-experience, an experience that confirms both the docility and agency of the human form. It demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of ‘culture,’ as there are many subcultural manifestations of sport. Therefore assignment of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ cultures, and further the idea of a singular ‘Culture,’ has been taken apart in sociology and recognized as a privileged position, insensitive to the uniqueness of human experience. This is not to engage in a relativistic turn, it is to articulate that the loudest voices of history are not exhaustive, and further that this is echoed in both of these disciplines. Like Marxian political economy the base and superstructure influence one another. Marxian theory itself parallels assertions about sport, in that, “…sport is perceived to be an aspect of culture embodying struggle and contestation…” (Hargreaves and McDonald 52). One of my major interpretations of Cultural Studies is that there is conflict and an inherent tension between different paradigms, however I do not truly see this conflict as being with modern Sociology(ies).

So…

My final question is to you all, if Cultural Studies differentiates from Functionalist Sociologies (i.e. Parsonian Structural Functionalism), does it also differ from Sociologies of the post-modern/linguistic turn? Do Haraway, Foucault, Derrida, Saussure, Lyotard and other theorists labelled as ‘post-structuralist’ and or ‘post-modern’ have a place in Cultural Studies? Therefore, can these disciplines be reconciled?

Post-script:

and Regarding Paloma's post I thought I should bring back an old friend:

From Beamish to King

Johnson, R. (1986-87) What is cultural studies anyway? Social Text, 16, 38-80.

Already, I must mention how impressed and humbled I am by cultural theory and particularly Johnson’s remarkable writing. There is definitely an exceptional conceptual skill to developing a fluid yet clear writing style that weaves between macro theories of power, the social lives of subjective forms and their textual representation and embodiment (62). Johnson’s addresses three main cultural studies models including; production-based studies, text-based studies and studies of lived cultures (73). These models are derived from cultural studies’ aim, “to abstract, describe and reconstitute in concrete studies the social forms through which human beings "live," become conscious, sustain themselves subjectively" (45). In order to do this, there is a need to examine the forms of power associated with knowledge creation through an integrated approach to "abstraction" and the "concrete studies" as opposed to considering them in opposition (39).

I was particularly interested in the interplay between "text's as productive" and "cultural consumption as a production process" in order to see interplay rather than reducing creativity (perhaps the creative process(ing)) to the producer or critic (58).

Also her reference to Bertolt Brecht’s theatre clarifies my attempt in the first class to elaborate on the formality as well as the privileging of academic writing and problems that this may pose when striving to represent subjective narratives.

As text and the written word is part of common knowledge creation in academia, are we precipitating divisions between a diversity of knowledge-creation methods and possibly completely overlooking others? As tools, categorization, taxonomic techniques and epistemologies become formalized, what is being lost at the expense of professionalism?

I would be interested to here any feedback on this reading as it includes a multitude of other relevant issues to be explored.

Martin, Emily. (1992). "Body narratives, Body boundaries." in L. Grossberg, G. Nelson and P. Treichler (Eds.), Cultural Studies (pp. 409-18). New York: Routledge.

Once upon a time, in the micro-level of the body, was an egg and many sperm, this was the beginning…

The narratives presented by Martin illustrate quite humorously the narratives of the 'miracle of life.' That is, if the female body is not be (unproductively) menstruating and the passive eggs not overcome with a contraceptive resulting in a further hostile environment in which the sperm attempt to embark on their executive mission. I can not help but think of Johnson's consideration of the limits of text and sarcasm provides a perfect example of one of the difficult expressions to communicate through writing.

Martin elaborates on the conception (and conceptual) imagery of early gender-associated roles on the cellular level that are created through scientific and academic language. While we often address language and sign representations in literature, media, and particularly religious texts concerning creation, it occurred to me how little science texts are assessed regarding their narratives of (pro)creation. In fields that have a high degree of formalism such as academia, how can we negotiate spaces in which to present what Martin refers to as "co-existing and contending knowledges of the body"? (419).

I was especially impressed with her adamant effort to engage in critical theory and practice with educators in less-privileged communities which explicitly exemplifies a (growing?) divide between what is considered formal academic knowledge and specific community initiatives that are equally committed to critical pedagogy.

Lastly, as medico-moral discourses allow for us to consider 21st century patients as body environments (415), what could be other issues and/or implications of attributing intention and personhood on a micro-cellular level?

I withheld some discussion to adhere to the word count guideline, but I look forward to discussing this further next week. Steph's posts will follow shortly...

Paloma