Kant, Immanuel. (1784). An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment? Retrieved 1/11/10 from http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant/html.
Hamilton P. (1996). The Enlightenment and the birth of social science. In S. Hall, D. Held, D. Hubert, K. Thompson (Eds.), Modernity: An introduction to modern societies (pp. 20-54). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hall, S. (1996). On postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall. In D. Morley & K. Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (pp.131-150). London: Routledge.
Butler, J. (1992). Contingent foundations. In J. Butler & J. Scott (Eds.), Feminists theorize the political (pp.3-21). London: Routledge.
McDonald, M. (2002). Queering whiteness: The peculiar case of the Women’s National Basketball Association. Sociological Perspectives, 45, 379-396.
This week’s readings covered a range of themes, both historically and conceptually, from the Enlightenment, through modernity, to postmodernity. In this initial post, to help spur discussion, I try to map the arguments from Kant to Buter--via Hamilton, Hall, and McDonald--so as to tie the readings together, and provoke questions along the way.
To begin, the emergence of sociology as a field of study (and, eventually cultural studies), was the result, in part, of Enlightenment thinking. As Kant (1784) argued at the time, the central paradigm of the Enlightenment was to allow the free thinking man [sic] to emerge from a self-imposed immaturity. Kant saw man as shackled and confined by rules and formulas--i.e. the church, physicians, nobility--that prevented him from free, rational, and scientific thought. Kant, like other philosophes, saw the Enlightenment as a gradual, but inevitable process that could not be achieved through a coup d’état, but rather, through a revolution of the mind. Only through individual free thought could the unthinking masses be emancipated (Kant, 1784).
As Hamilton (1996) outlines, the “birth of sociology” can be traced to Enlightenment thinkers--primarily Henri de Saint-Simon, and Auguste Comte. These Enlightenment thinkers sought to construct a “positive science” of society that would be based on critical rationalism and apply reason to social, political and economic issues. The new field of social science would concern itself with progress, emancipation, and improvement. Essentially it sought to build upon the works of previous generations of pilosophes to continue enlightened thinking. The Enlightenment became tied to the idea of modernity as society was thought of as something over and above the individual. It was through the social that progress, science, and rational thought--ideologies that would later be symbolized by the American and French Revolutions--would bring about the modern free man.
Hamilton (1996) argues that the Enlightenment was not only the precursor to modernity, but rather, the pursuit of it. He argues that the Enlightenment involved characteristically sociological concerns about how societies are organized and developed, and that philosophes saw an essential uniformity in human nature (an issues that post-modern scholars would go on to challenge as both Hall (1996) and Butler (1992) note). This brings me to the question that if, as Hamilton discusses, the Enlightenment was localized to Western Europe in the 18th Century (Hall also calls modernism a “western phenomenon”), how does this idea of the Enlightenment as the pursuit of modernity serve to ignore the other forms of modernity in other parts of the globe (the global South for example), and privilege this western, linear version of history over others?
Now, in the little space that I have left, I would like to get to the issue of postmodernity. Both Hall (1996) and Butler (1992) present what they see as the central facets of postmodernism, yet they both question what we mean when using the term postmodern. Hall (1996) argues that postmodernity holds two charges. First, there is nothing of significance but modern culture, and there are no contradictory forces to it. Second, these changes are profound and we have no choice but to reconcile ourselves to them. Similarly, Butler (1992) argues that a number of positions are attached to postmodernity: discourse is all there is; the subject is dead; ‘I’ can never be used; and there is no reality, only representations (p.4). While Hall and Butler are similar in this regard, I think they differ in how they view the usefulness of postmodernity. Both discuss how postmodernist thought involves the “collapse of the real” as a dominant type of representation into fragmented forms. Hall argues that we cannot conceptualize language without meaning, representation, ideology. He takes issues with two “postmodern” scholars, questioning Baudrillard’s argument that we are at the end of signifying practice, and Foucault’s use of the discursive without an ideological dimension.
Where Hall sees these issues as problematic, Butler takes another position. She argues that the project of postmodernism is to call into question the ways in which paradigms--the set of interconnected ideas that provide an image of the world and a way of thinking about it--oppress and erase that which they seek to explain. While Hall challenges the notion of a break between modernism and postmodernism, is it perhaps here where this rupture becomes visible? Philosophes saw a universality to human knowledge and people: postmodern scholars (a grouping to which Butler has been attach) challenge this notion of universality. Butler (1992) questions how a theory or politics can be grounded in a position which is “universal” when the very category depends on ethnocentric biases based on exclusion and difference.
I think that this brings back the question of positionality discussed last week. From a postmodern perspective that operates against totalizing notions, and seeks to renegotiate subjectivity, can there ever be a true subjectivity? Or are subjects always fragmented and require deconstruction? How do we account for a multiplicity of positions? Do we agree with Hall that postmodernity is limiting in that it closes off history and assumes that there is no future, only the present? Or, do we see postmodernity as providing new avenues for critiques by challenging hegemonic practices and ideologies through “postmodern” approaches like queer theory, as McDonald (2002) argues?
Hall and Butler seem to be directly in conversation and somewhat in dispute with each other, both trying to make sense of what the ‘postmodern condition’ looks like. It is interesting to note how similar both positions are, the only real (and I use than term loosely) division between the sides seems to be semantics.
ReplyDeleteLike a true modernist, Hall seems to be searching for explanation and meaning within a tradition to define itself. While he recognizes the validity in acknowledging multiple truths and meanings, he takes issue with the idea that meaning cannot exist at all. Hall finds this line of postmodern thought problematic and claims that postmodern theorists have taken the easy way out by refusing to identify the structural domains (meaning, representation etc) that put an issue into context. He uses Foucault as an example and criticizes him for identifying the political but failing to ground it in an idea of politics.
In what seems to be a direct reply, Butler states that, “to claim that politics requires a stable subject is to claim that there can be no political opposition to that claim” (4). I understand this to mean that identifying the politics within the political is to essentialize it, and to put limiting contexts and boundaries around it. Butler goes on to state that a key part of postmodernisn is to question paradigms such as politics that risk limiting and reducing its own explanation. Is that really an implosion of meaning or is it simply a critical reconstruction of it?
The definition and division of modern and postmodern thought seems to be overly semantic. Halls states that his modernist/poststructuralist-light position questions power relations and how social formations are rooted in power. Butler also states that postmodern thinking is rooted in critiquing the implications of power. While she refuses to conceptualize postmodern thought as a unity (because that’s too modernist), she does state that a part of postmodernism is the critical engagement of theory and its power relations. So how are modern and postmodern traditions significantly different? Does it not seem like the only rupture between the two lines of thought is semantics?
Hall addresses this issue as well and states that, “what matters is not the terminology but the conceptualization” and I think that I agree (136). From my understanding, the major difference between modernity and postmodernity is that within postmodern thought meaning is so multiple that it exists but only for the smallest snapshot of time. I always understood the postmodern position on meaning to be that time and space are so fluid and fleeting that meaning, representation and signification, and ideology cannot be captured because they change with every second. In this case, meaning is not only multiple but always subjective and ongoing. To me, that is why McDonald refuses to define ideas of ‘violence’ or ‘whiteness’ because their meanings are only relevant in the moment.
I think that this post is evidence of my struggle to try to understand and reconcile both traditions. I take comfort in knowing that even Judith Butler does not know what postmodernism is and that it is this confusion that maintains postmodern dialogue as regenerative and ongoing.
Robbie, you ask if, from a postmodern perspective, there can ever be a true subjectivity, or if we must always fragment and deconstruct subject positions. I believe both Butler and McDonald (in an application of the former’s concepts) advance our understanding of subjectivity quite well. Although Butler does not necessarily call herself a postmodern scholar - she has trouble even defining the term - she explains her view of the disappearance of the “I” subject position often associated with postmodernism. She argues that the “’I,’ is constituted by … [theoretical] positions, and these ‘positions’ are not merely theoretical products, but fully embedded organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements, those matrices of power and discourse that produce me as a viable ‘subject’” (p. 9). Thus, the subject, the ‘I’ or the ‘Robbie,’ is created by one’s constantly shifting theories, material realities and discourses; you are never one stable ‘you,’ but constituted by everything that has informed your thinking and your actions. This is not to say that you do not exist, but that there is no “true” you if “true” refers to a stable and fully known identity.
ReplyDeleteButler believes that the subject and other social identities popularly understood as single, fixed categories (i.e. “totalizing universals”) must be deconstructed in order to reveal their constituent forces. In essence, she believes these identities must be opened up for contestation as sites of political struggle. McDonald attempts to do this discursively, but also calls for a physical negotiation of identities in the WNBA. Using queer theory to problematize the heterosexual, White, feminine woman created within WNBA discourse, she advocates for disarticulating these identities to reveal power relations inherent in their construction. She refers to Cahn (1998) to explain that the WNBA can serve as a space where these identities are contested; in essence, “the WNBA has offered and continues to provide women with spaces to enact a multitude of divergent social and sexual possibilities” (p. 392). This utilization of WNBA discourse and space for contesting universalizing identities is consistent with Butler’s notion of deconstructing totalizing subjectivities; both are performed to reveal power relations and create sites of political struggle.
One of the notions I’ve been struggling with, that I think Jess is attempting to confront/reconcile, is the idea of what postmodernism IS. I don’t think postmodernism is just a semantic break, as Jess questions. While I agree that both modernism and postmodernism attempt to illuminate power relations, I would say that this is a defining feature of critical sociology in general, and not specific to the articulation of what is modern or postmodern. What I am having most difficulty understanding is if postmodernism is an epoch that follows modernism (i.e. that the world has become too complex, that there is no real meaning anymore, no narratives, etc., as Hall seems to suggest in his “definition” of postmodernism) or if it represents a new way of understanding the world. Hall states that a postmodernist would argue the world has collapsed/imploded the “real.” He counters, however, with the fact that ¾ of the world have not even entered this “real” state. I’m not sure this articulation of postmodernism is consistent with postmodern Third World feminist postulations, for instance. Their argument, I believe, would be that this notion of “real” does not, and never has, existed; that it’s an invention of a modernist project/perspective that defines modernity as rationality, progress, and (individual) freedom. Meanings of “real” are context-specific and always have been. Thus, I believe some postmodernists attempt to deconstruct the notion of modernity in and of itself, and don’t view postmodernism as merely a new “stage” after modernity (which Hall seems to suggest). It is also quite possible that I’m misunderstanding Hall, so perhaps someone else can shed some light on this!
In response to Robbie’s “closing off of history” question – I think it depends on the methods by which (that is, the how, what, where, when, why) one’s understanding of post[-]modernity came about.
ReplyDelete“Immaturity,” (1) intellectual laziness, or what I’ve interpreted to be the inability to engage in critical thinking, according to Kant (1784), was characteristic of people(s) who were too easily controlled, influenced, and normalized in the “pre-modern” world (a notion much like “post”-colonial, do the people(s) of Third World countries not still, today, experience colonization?). By daring his eighteenth-century readers to uncover more truthful truths, that is, to become more well-informed and hence (re)negotiate personal understandings (or is it personal discourses? ideologies?), Kant (1784) was inviting the “masses,” the marginalized people(s) of his day, to recognize that they, as a community, as a culture, had a broader context that could be, and needed to be constantly critiqued.
When we then deconstruct Hamilton’s main argument, for example, that “In order to understand the impact of the Enlightenment on modern sociology and the emergent social sciences ... we must ... examine the carry-through of Enlightenment ideas into nineteenth,” twentieth and then twenty-first centuries (22), to me, it means that there seems to be a divide between those who practice a more “traditional,” British Cultural Studies academic programme and those who practice a more Americanized version. This is something that Hall (1996) alluded to,
"I am a post—Marxist only in the sense that I recognize the necessity to move beyond orthodox Marxism ... So ‘post’ means, for me, going on thinking on the ground of a set of established problems, a problematic. It doesn’t mean deserting that terrain but rather using as one’s reference point. They are central to my formation and I don’t believe in endless, trendy recycling of one fashionable theorist after another, as if you can wear new theories like t-shirts.” 148
As such, me, us, having read and hence being influenced by what I will again call a more “traditional” (European) approach to cultural studies, which, I will also argue, teaches more methodologically and theoretically sound research techniques, I would be interested in hearing others’ opinions on the post/post-modern (and post/post-colonial) debate.
In closing, and to your last question Robbie, I do think we see “‘postmodern’ approaches like queer theory” as a method/ology by which we can critique dominant ideology. Although I enjoyed the McDonald (2002) article, I think if it was written in 2009-2010 it would be an overanalysis of some things that I hope to discuss in seminar since I am running out of room. Thanks.
When reading texts written in the 18th century, do you ever wonder what the author’s viewpoints would be like should they have the opportunity to re-write them today? I couldn’t help but wonder what Kant would have to say about the “age of enlightenment” in the 21st century. Has mankind really gone through this age? Will we ever go through this age, and if so, how will we do it? It seems as though the world today is increasingly creating means by which man has to think less, perform less, and even walk less. It’s become practically impossible, at least in the western world, to execute any task without the aid of some sort of technological device. Kant calls enlightenment “...man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity,” and by immaturity he means “...the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another.” I’m not clear on whether or not Kant believed there was a distinct beginning or end to the “age of enlightenment,” but in my opinion, it began at the creation of mankind and it won’t end until the human race becomes extinct.
ReplyDeleteKant talks about how freedom could lead to enlightenment. In the 18th century, man was not free. People were governed by religion and followed strict rules. Today, man continues to not be free. There is no such thing as free speech, people are not allowed to do whatever they please, and we are most often guided to behave in certain manners. We live by the law and by the normative rules in society. We are also greatly influenced by the mass media. Stuart Hall talks about “the real” and how “...three quarters of the human race have not entered the era of what we are pleased to call “the real.”” He explains how we are pushed away from “the real” by mass culture through institutions like the media. The impact of the media on how we live our lives can alone prevent us from ever reaching the so called maturity that the end of the enlightenment promises. Hall also talks about how the masses can take over the world and recreate culture. I think that this occurs on a constant basis in the 21st century. There are always new trends, new role models, and further advancements in technology. We are constantly redefining ourselves through mass culture, and literally becoming reproductions of its norms. For example; I didn’t use my own thoughts to choose the clothes I put on today, but rather I was guided by the masses as to what is both acceptable and desirable to wear for the audiences in my society today.
Kant believed that mankind could escape the constant need for guidance through courage. I rarely come across an opportunity to be courageous. I fear rejection and judgement on my personal thoughts on a daily basis. Can we ever reach maturity (as Kant portrays it) in today’s version of the world? If so, how could it be possible to achieve?
Carolyn, your overview of Butler’s arguments on subjectivity is great. I agree with you, and Butler, that there can never be a stable “Robbie”, as you put it. In essence, I think that identity politics require a healthy negotiation and are always in contest. However, similar to the question that Mel posed like week (can there be too much reflexivity), do you think there can ever be enough, or too much, subjectivity? Do we not require at some level, however problematic, some universal understanding of identities?
ReplyDeleteI also think it’s interesting that--as McDonald (2002) argues--the WNBA and sport in general, are arenas in which identities can be contested: They are however, also venues where identities are (re)created. I think this raises interesting questions as to how dominant knowledges are produced, perpetuated, and contested. Thus, while the WNBA provides an opportunity to challenge hegemonic notions of whiteness and hetero-normativity, these competing ideologies are not afforded equal ground in popular discourse.
Like Jess, I too question what we mean by postmodernism. I share the same sentiments as Max in that--in many ways--postmodernist thought builds on many ideals of modernism. Although this isn’t an answer to the question, postmodernism values a multiplicity of meanings and understandings, and as such, postmodern theory can be read in many ways depending on the context. Thus, as Carolyn and Max alluded to, what is “postmodern” is very different to a feminist scholar and a post-colonial scholar, for example.
Erica, you raise an interesting point regarding how the media and technology can perpetuate our “immaturity”. I think some interesting links can be draw here to Foucault. As Foucault traces the shift of discipline and punishment from a visible corporeal manifestation to a more subversive, and internalize one, is it possible to conceptualize media in having a similar role in constraining our free-thought. While we have agency to make our own choices, do hegemonic practices and ideologies constrain the range of choices available to us. I think these are all good topics of discussion for class.
Robbie - I absolutely agree with you that sport is a venue where identities are (re)created. Indeed, McDonald's argument is just that: the WNBA has mobilized the discourse of the safe, white, feminine mother in order to perhaps "tame" its image and appeal to a mass audience. It also demonstrates more insidious power relations that maintain and constantly reconstruct racialized and sexualized difference. I think her (and Cahn's) point is merely that sport could potentially become a site where these identities are contested. The WNBA is perhaps optimally situated for this endeavour, as it is a space inhabited by a significant proportion of Black women, engaging in an activity that challenges traditional gender norms. As you allude to, contestation is not inevitable due to hegemonic notions of sex and race. Because hegemony is, though, defined in part by its negotiated nature, there is some reason to hope that this struggle might take place. The mechanisms by which this could occur is a "million dollar question," so to speak.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Jess that after reading Hall’s (1996) article, the difference between modernism and postmodernism appeared to be a matter of semantics. After reading Butler (1992), distinctions between the two became more evident. I particularly liked her description of subjectivity, which Carolyn described so well. However, I continue to remain unclear of the meaning of postmodernism and I cannot help but wonder if its elusiveness is intentional. Butler addresses a number of paradoxes that exist within postmodernism and I question whether this is why the term remains so vague? The most obvious paradox is the actual use of the word postmodernism: the title itself is a “unifying sign” and a form of totalizing, which is contradictory to the postmodernist philosophy. Whether intentional or not, Hall’s (1996) irony when he describes postmodernism as ideological - a concept that postmodernism has abandoned – further emphasizes the paradox that exists. Do postmodernists attempt to diminish the contradiction of having a “unifying sign” by attaching multiple meanings? Do the multiple meanings ensure that the term remains fluid and “a site of permanent openness and resignifiability”, and hence more aligned with postmodernist thought (Butler, 1992: 16)?
ReplyDeleteTo address Robbie’s question with regards to postmodernism and history: I agree with Hall (1996) that the historical, economical and political forces that have shaped today’s societies and cultures cannot be ignored. However, I question Hall’s (1996) statement that “postmodernism attempts to close off the past by saying history is finished, therefore you needn’t go back to it.” (137). Hall frames postmodernism as though it ignores history, but being in the present does not necessarily negate the past. So I question whether this “closing off” of history is universal (I use the term loosely) to all postmodernists? If so, how does Foucault’s (a postmodernist) use of genealogy, which goes back in history to try to understand people, society and power, fit into postmodern thought?
Carolyn, you question whether postmodernism is a break from modernity and a new way of seeing the world. From this week’s readings, I have come away with the impression that postmodernists see themselves as new thinkers, quite separate from those of the Age of Enlightenment or modernism. However, I do not agree that they see the world in a completely new way. Perhaps it is new in comparison to the western-centric age of enlightenment and modernity, but I see many similarities between postmodernism and the eastern philosophies of Buddhism. So is it really a new way of thinking, or just a new western way of thinking?
I think I have posed more questions than I have answered, but I want to thank you for all your insightful posts as they have definitely helped me grasp my first introduction to postmodernism!
A “po-mo” post from a logophile:
ReplyDelete“semantic,” a. and n. Relating to signification or meaning (OED, 2a.)
Of course, the word, especially in its plural form, is normally employed in the pejorative sense of quibbling over mere words rather than significant issues.
My son looked at my readings for this week and said, “Postmodern. Does that mean crazy? You know, people use the term ‘po-mo’ as a synonym for ‘crazy.’” I suppose discrediting something as “crazy” is one way of dealing with what Butler notes is the “fearful conditional” (p. 3) that many employ when faced with postmodern—or perhaps more accurately, post-structuralist—thinking. After all, a simple dismissal is easy, especially when the option is, as Robbie mentioned, “account[ing] for a multiplicity of positions.” Sounds like hard work.
Similarly, I suppose it would be hard work to imagine postmodernisms rather than one unifying postmodernism. The impetus to categorize, to classify, is evident in all sorts of human activity, and it inevitably entails a loss of meaning.
What happens, in language, when Hall says, “at its centre is what I would call a recognizably postmodern experience” (p. 134)? Melanie notes his irony elsewhere. Is this subtle insistence of a postmodern focal point ironic?
While we shouldn’t think of all Enlightenment thinkers as uniform, what seems to shine through is their common anchor: man. Such an appeal to common sense is hard to shake.
“metonymy,” n. Rhetoric. (A figure of speech characterized by) the action of substituting for a word or phrase denoting an object, action, institution, etc., a word or phrase denoting a property or something associated with it; an instance of this (OED, a.). Think of what gets lost when “Lyotard” (or “Baudrillard”) stands in for a generation of thoughts. History, perhaps.
It’s funny that both Butler and Hall bring up the issue of celebration. For Hall, Baudrillard is irresponsible in his celebration of the implosion of meaning; for Butler, the U.S. celebration of the success of its intentional actions is premature, in that the consequences must always “supersede the stated intention or purpose of the act” (p. 10).
“polyphony,” n. Literary Criticism. A multiplicity of independent and often antithetic narrative voices, none of which is given predominance; the use of this narrative technique (OED, 2b). Do postmodernists purposefully multiply meaning?
My intentions in writing this post are unrecoverable.
p.s.
ReplyDeleteDid you notice that "An Interview with Stuart Hall" was actually drawn from a couple of sources and presented as a coherent whole?