Foucault, M. 1980. “Two lectures” in C. Gordon (Ed.), Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977 (pp. 78-108). New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. 1981a. Questions of method: an interview with Michel Foucault. Ideology and Consciousness, 8, 3-14.
Foucault, M. 1981b. Method. In History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (pp. 92-102). Penguin.
King, S. (2008). What’s Queer About (Queer) Sport Sociology Now? A Review Essay. Sociology of Sport Journal, 25, 419-442.
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The first three of this week’s readings were concerned with better communicating the methodologies employed by Michel Foucault in his post-1970 researches, which was supposedly when he became interested in “the how of power” (1980, p.92). In particular, Foucault sought to explore how certain “mechanisms of power, at a given moment ... by a means of a certain number of transformations ... become economically advantageous and ... politically useful” (101) to bourgeois society. Especially since the mid-1960s, because social scientists have become increasingly intolerant of “the inhibiting effect[s] of ... global, totalitarian theories” (Power/Knowledge, p.80-81), it was not Foucault’s intention to establish universal truths. “In contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science,” he wrote, “a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection” (85).
Interesting were the ways in which Foucault conceived of power. First, in Power/Knowledge (1980), “Power is essentially that which represses ... nature, the instincts, a class, individuals ... So should not the analysis of power be first and foremost an analysis of the mechanisms of repression” (p.89-90)? This notion is something in which King (2008) seems to agree. For instance, she calls “for [sociology of sport] studies that critically interrogate, rather than reproduce, White bourgeois normativity” (p.420). Because Foucault’s frameworks don’t interpret power to always be subordinate to the economy, he advocated for a post-Marxist conceptualization of power. In P/K (1980), he specifically sought to generate discussion around “an economy of discourse of truth ... There can be no exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (93). Although peoples, communities, cultures, etc. are constituted by certain discourses, he notes on p.98 that the individual is also a vehicle of power. If genealogies are in fact “anti-sciences” (83), as Foucault alludes to, then I ask: how, when, and why are they so? Also, what is [t]his notion of truth economics? How does an economy of truth and surveillance work together to shape the behaviour of social actors? Furthermore interesting was [t]his notion of the body being permeated by social forces, however, because this is where Foucault seems to lose me, I also ask: how are our bodies permeated by social forces? Do these forces literally penetrate our skin or do they influence us by some other means? Lastly, switching authors, why does King repeatedly use “White” as opposed to “white” throughout her piece? (Did you interpret this to be political, like I?)
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault proclaims that wherever there is “power” there is also resistance, which “comes from below” (94). He argues that power is not a binary division between ruled/r – which has been “inscribed in [power] as [the] irreducible opposite [T/F]” (96) – and that it is not acquired seized, shared, etc., but rather “exercised from innumerable points” (94). Because this plurality of resistances exists, King sees the unclearness of queerness to be advantageous in challenging hegemonic ideology: “If queer takes nonnormativity seriously, it should be applicable to any deviation from the norm, to any site of cultural familiarity that critics with to make strange” (436). Foucault furthermore adds, in H of S, that “it is in the sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power” (97). He then proceeds to outline his four “cautionary prescriptions” for investigating power: 1) the Rule of immanence; 2) Rule of continual variation; 3) Rule of double conditioning; and 4) Rule of tactical polyvalence of discourse (pp. 98-102). However, because I have lots more to say, I’m going to refrain from commenting and would instead like to open the floor for others to do so if they found these rules of interest. If necessary, some probing questions are: did Foucault convince you of anything? What does he mean by “spheres of force relations” (97)? Was his interpretation of power relevant to your own research objects? With King’s article and her above quote in mind, what are some examples of behaviours that may be classified as “queer” and what are the pro’s and con’s of such a poststructural classificatory system?
It’s clear that Foucault sought to influence a wide audience in his scholarly pursuits. (King, a renowned scholar, is just one example.) In Power/Knowledge he claims the inconclusive nature of his project/s was/were purposeful: “They were merely lines laid down for you to pursue or to divert elsewhere, for me to extend upon or re-design as the case might be. They are, in the final analysis, just fragments, and it is up to you or me to see what we can make of them” (78-9). He makes a similar claim in Questions of Method, “I like to open up space[s for] research, try [them] out ... where those who may be interested are invited to join in ... My books ... at most ... are philosophical fragments put to work in a historical field of problems” (1981a, p. 4). He asked, for instance, “How does one punish?” in Discipline in Punish, and sought to shed light on the politics of in/sanity in Madness and Civilization, as examples. In Questions of Method, he then states,
The target of analysis wasn’t institutions, theories, or ideologies, but practices – with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies ... but possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and ‘reason.’ (5)
In other words, his researches investigated “eventualisations” as opposed to events. The “eventualisation” of a research object “lightens the weight of causality, [it] thus works by constructing around the singular event analyzed as a process ... a ‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not given in advance and can never properly be taken as infinite” (6). This polymorphism of a research object results in a multiplicity of genealogies, which will then act as anchorage points for one’s (read: researcher’s) intellectual pursuits. Comparatively speaking, in discussing lesbian-centered theories, studies in hegemonic masculinity, and poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, and queer theory, how did King contribute to the opening up of space (or how has she provided “anchorage points”) for future researchers?
In this concluding paragraph, I ask (necessarily I think): who was Michel Foucault as a scholar? Was he postmodern (even if he argued “no” to that question in the past)? Who has the right to define his intellectual pursuits? Because it’s natural for our interpretations of scholarly work to be quite different, what did you find MORE interesting than I (what did I neglect to cover, in other words)? That is another open call ;) Finally, did learning about Foucauldian methodologies contribute to your own understanding of the world in some way (that is general, I know)?
-Max
According to Foucault, the body is permeated by social forces, not through any sort of physical coercion, but through the power produced in truth. In Two Lectures, we are exposed to the Power-Right-Truth triangle which explains that societies are subjected to power through the production of truth. These truths are disseminated through societal institutions and hierarchies that are considered rightful or seen as deserving of this power, which consequently further justifies their power. Disciplinary power circulates truths within our society that seek to define truth and deem what’s normal in society. As Foucault explains, such disciplinary power is so diffused and ubiquitous within the networks of our society that it does not need to physically permeate our skin. Almost everything we believe to be true about society and ourselves is implicated in this discursive power but because of its ubiquity, we fail to realize the forces of disciplinary power at work.
ReplyDeleteAccording to Foucault, people within a society are the vehicles of power. Through the acceptance and propagation of social norms, Truths are reproduced and disseminated within the web like networks of a society. Just as such discursive truths are created; resistance is also created in reaction. This is where Foucault’s notion of the insurrection of subjugated knowledge becomes so crucial. Within Two Lectures, Foucault explains subjugated knowledge as the, “blocs of historical knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and systematizing theory and which criticism – which obviously draws upon scholarship- has been able to reveal” (82). Subjugated knowledges are the neglected pieces of history, the naïve experiences of individuals, as well as the experiences deemed, “disqualified as inadequate” (82), the information that challenges hegemonic truths. Foucault’s notion of genealogy emancipates such knowledges from their silenced and marginalized positions. Exposing these knowledges challenges the hegemonic discursive power that dominates within society. Ultimately an understanding of these powers leads to an understanding of the processes of power, how it suppresses and marginalizes, and the reasons as to why such power is exercised.
In Questions of Method, Foucault explains that the importance of understanding practices and processes involved in systems of power within society. Using his analysis of the prison in Discipline and Punish, Foucault explains that the geneaology of the prison system reveals the conditions of punishment and the rationale of imprisonment that created the system at any given point. It is an understanding of the processes and practices that facilitate an experience to occur. According to Foucault, analysing these processes to, “its smallest depth” will help elucidate the processes that facilitate other power relations in society such as the school and medical systems (7). Foucault states that he did not write about the process of carceralisation for those who work within the system but for those who are subject to it. The question that I am left with is how do those who are subject to this carceralisation gain access to Foucault’s work? Who is he really writing for?
One more question before my time is up. In King’s article, Halperin states that, “queer is… whatever is at odds with the normal, legitimate, the dominant” (424). While such a broad definition of queerness can define a larger realm of sexualities and identities, does it not face the same overgeneralization and loss of meaning that a term like colonialism can?
Jess, one potential issue with overgeneralization immediately popped into my head when I read your post: As gayness has became more mainstream, it has come to represent not only homosexuality but also weird things or behaviours. "That's so gay" we've heard thousands - if not tens of thousands - of times growing up. (Yes, I'm guilty for saying that and similar things too in the not-too-distant past; I can't pretend I've never used "gay" maliciously.) With that said, in the same time period (childhood/adolesence), although I knew the word "queer" existed, I can't say I used it, nor do I recall reading it or hearing it that often. What I am trying to get at is: if "queer," queerness, etc. become more mainstream or overgeneralized, will society resist by using the word maliciously?
ReplyDeleteIn other words, will something be "queer" or not to the average Joe? (read: binary)
Adding to Max and Jess’ discussion around Foucault’s (1976) lectures on power, truth and right, I am going to address the power of discourse and the methodologies recommended by Foucault, Mohanty (1988) and King (2008) to overcome the persistence of specific, dominant discourses. In Power and Knowledge, Foucault (1976) is concerned with the power of discourses that are taken as truths, and the subjugating potential that power, truth and right, have in producing these discourses. Like Foucault, King (2008) and Mohanty (1988) are concerned with the subjugating power of discourse and in their articles they question methodologies that perpetuate oppressive discourse in queer and feminist studies respectively. In order to stop the reproduction of what King terms “White bourgeois normativity” or what Mohanty labels “Third World Women”, the authors draw on Foucault’s concept of genealogy, and I believe are recommending Foucault’s “ascending analysis of power” (p.99) as one form of analysis. This “ascending analysis of power” takes into account history and the smallest mechanisms of power and then looks at how these small mechanisms of power are “invested, colonized, ulitilized… by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination” (p. 99). Using the example of the “insane” he states that in order to understand how “mechanisms of power [are] able to function” (p.100), it is necessary to consider history, the social and environmental contexts as well as time rather than to be satisfied with the explanation given by the dominant bourgeoisie. Is this not what Mohanty is arguing with each of her examples of how Western feminist scholars continue to reinforce “Third World Woman’s” singular identity as oppressed? And is King not addressing a similar issue when she points out that Krane and Barber’s (2005) lesbian-centered methodologies fail to examine how “lesbian identities are constituted” (p.430)? And also that by ignoring historical forces and power relations, Krane and Barber generalize their participants’ experiences, thereby, precipitating “a hierarchy of oppression” which favours White normativity (p.430-431)? Are all three authors not saying the same thing: that it is necessary to understand history, process and power relations in order to prevent the precipitation of discourses that favour generalized identities, which in turn create a “hierarchy of oppression” (King, 2008: p.430)?
ReplyDeleteOn a completely separate note, I hesitate to bring-up Becker again, but I cannot help but see a connection between Foucault’s (1976) subjugated knowledge and Becker’s (1998) “trick” of thinking beyond the boundaries and his emphasis on “turn[ing] things around, to see things differently, in order to create new problems for research…” (p.7). I realize I am comparing Foucault, who takes more of a post-modernist approach to his work and Becker who is much more of an empiricist, but in their own way, are they really recommending the same thing?
Max, I’d like to address your question regarding genealogies as anti-sciences. In “Two Lectures” and his chapter on Method, Foucault argues that we should approach our work through “local centers” of power-knowledge (1981, p. 98) rather than through global “totalitarian theories” (P/K p. 80). Foucault argues that universalizing theoretical approaches like Marxism and psychoanalysis are in fact hindrances to research because knowledge, power, and truth are discontinuous, fluid, multiple, and localized. I think Foucault’s conception of power elucidates his theoretical and methodological approach. He does not see power as a general form of domination by one group over another or as something than can be acquired, but rather as something that exists everywhere and creates a grid of intelligibility of society that is always local and unstable. Foucault writes that power is a process of “ceaseless struggles and confrontations” that “transforms, strengthens, or reverses” a multiplicity of power relations (1981, p. 93). Thus, in Foucault’s view, any theoretical approach that subscribes to grand-narratives is inherently flawed because power, knowledge, and truth, can only be formed and reformed in localities. Through a return to knowledge that is formed in local criticism, Foucault argues that the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle become visible and allow for the rediscovery of disqualified subjugated knowledges that have been marginalized because of hierarchical power structures” (P/K, p. 82). Foucault argues that it is through such a genealogical approach that the “tyranny of globalizing discourses with their hierarch and...privileges of a theoretical avant-garde” are eliminated to uncover local, popular, differential knowledges: genealogies are, Foucault writes, thus “precisely anti-sciences” (P/K, p. 82).
ReplyDeleteI think King (2008), takes a similar “anti-science” approach to her work in her call for a Queer approach to the sociology of sport that interrogates and challenges White bourgeois normativity and identity politics: a “return to knowledge” or sorts. Equally against universal truth claims, King argues that Queer approaches in the sociology of sport have focused on a the experiences of a “narrow stratum of North American and European lesbian and gay athletes” whose visibility and legitimacy are a product of hierarchical power structures and is advocating for research that “engages with the geopolitical urgencies of our time” (p. 420). Informed by Foucault’s and other post-structuralist work, Queer theory seeks to break down dominant and normative positions through what King identifies as five key features. Similar to Foucault understanding of the multiplicity of knowledge, Queer theory engages with subjugated knowledge through a politic of anti-identitarianism, post-structuralism, anti-normative, contingent knowledge and truth claims. I’m reminded here of our discussion last week regarding the importance of the genealogy of terms: given the similarities and interconnectedness of Foucault’s work, Queer theory, and other post-structuralist approaches, I’m wondering in what ways can Queer approaches be mobilized outside the realm of LGBTQ topics? In essence, can there be a Queering of race studies, for example, that does not focus on sex or sexuality? How would this approach be different and/or similar to critical race theory?
Immediately I would like to mention how much I enjoy Foucault week. It is not the average intellectual who can so convincingly compare himself to a metaphoric whale, or who is able to so eloquently accuse historians of being duped by discourse. I aspire to write in such an effective manner!
ReplyDeleteI think all of you raise very provoking questions which I will attempt to converse with. (To “answer” as a form of truth embedded in discourse would seem counterproductive to Foucault’s project). Max and Jess, you bring up the question of whether or not social forces permeate the skin. I believe that Foucault would say individuals operate precisely as a node of power that penetrates the skin. Disciplinary power, specifically, operates through individualization and breaking down movements to restrict bodies to move in a specific (i.e. controlled) manner. Disciplinary discourses create what we hold to be true and self-evident, thus shape our thinking and become embodied. Through disciplinary surveillance techniques we hand over control of our bodies to medical institutions that operate healing practices, which permeate every level of an individualized self. Alternately, through panoptic self-surveillance measures many of us control our eating and exercise patterns so that our bodies adhere to mediated images of (implicitly morally true) fitness. We, as individuals, reproduce this power and discourse by speaking and thinking in the same language that creates this disciplinary power. In every sense, thus, power penetrates our bodies.
Upon reading Foucault’s “interview” with historians I was transported back to our class-length discussion on what is “political.” I argue that Foucault’s work is political in the same sense that many cultural studies projects are defined. Mobilizing the image of paralysis (a counter to the common critique of Foucault as having an anaesthetic effect, or in other words, leaving no room for initiative), he argues that his purpose is precisely to have people “’no longer know what to do’, so that the acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous” (I&C p. 12). His “political” project is an attempt to disrupt commonsense/self-evident discourses in order to change people’s manner of “perceiving and doing things” (p. 12). It is counterproductive, he argues, to introduce and prescribe alternate grand narratives of being and doing things as these would simply act as new discourses and consequently new regimes of truth, hierarchy and power. King mobilizes this project of disrupting discourse by critiquing the ways in which cultural/social studies of sport have reproduced normative ideas of White bourgeois hetero/homo-normativity.
This leads me to your question, Max, about whether or not King’s use of the term White (as opposed to white) is political. If you mean political in the sense of disrupting self-evidences and power-wielding discourses I would say Yes. Though I am hesitant to speak for Dr. King on a topic she does not explicitly address (and to which she can easily counter in class tomorrow…), I believe she is exposing the power relations inherent in normalizing discourse of what it means to be “White.” Indeed, she is queering whiteness. Had King used ‘white’, she would have been reinforcing the normalized notion that people who are constructed as White have a biological and genetic (read skin tone) basis for this identity. As we are aware, however, race is a socially constructed identity/category that, while having real discursive and material consequences for everyone, is contingent upon the particular discourse(s) utilizing the term in a specific context. By capitalizing White, King is implicitly queering the category/identity of whiteness; in effect, she is reconceptualizing/re-employing white discourse in a critical manner in order to undermine and expose power relations, a method Foucault promotes in his History of Sexuality (p. 101).
I'm sorry for the second post, but Foucault inspires too many characters in me prohibited by blogspot.
ReplyDeleteFoucault and King have led me to question a number of concepts we've used in class. I am particularly interested in the relationship of identity and subjectivity. King employs both these terms, while my sense of Foucault over the course of my academic career is that he stresses subjectivity. What is the relationship between these terms? Do they overlap, are the mutually exclusive, or perhaps almost the same thing? Might Judith Butler help elucidate this question?
How does Foucault complicate notions of ideologies? I struggled a bit with this idea. Do ideologies simply become an outcome of discourse? Might there be a dialectical relationship between the two? Or would Foucault do away with notions of dialectics altogether, because the term/theoretical understanding doesn't recognize the contingency/interconnections/overlap of hierarchically-constructed separated phenomena?
Finally, what has Foucault to say about articulation and intersectionality? Can we flesh out a direct connection between Foucault and King (the latter which explicitly uses these terms and theoretical insights)? How does Foucault's work inspire reflexivity, and how might King's work operate in similar/different manner?
I'm making my one and only comment of the semester here just to clarify that I capitalized "White" because it is a requirement of the journal and the editors made me do it. I hope that's not too much of a theoretical letdown! Regardless, I agree that it raises interesting questions. I'm not a fan of capitalization (too essentializing and identity politics-y and weird to make White equivalent to Black), though I understand the political impetus behind the practice, at least for marginalized groups.
ReplyDeleteIn Two Lectures, Foucault discusses the way which truth is produced by power and is enforced throughout society. He explains how “speaking the truth” leads to rewards and wealth, and that ultimately, “we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.” (94)
ReplyDeleteBy choosing words that are not meant to be used in their literal senses, Foucault leaves his work open to interpretation, and the fact that his research is outdated (for us), it forces (us) to re-apply his findings to modern times. Last semester we studied Foucault briefly, and in that time I found myself constantly relating his work to my thesis, and how power and truth in society today relate to the construction of body image, and ultimately contribute to the issues that come along with it. I didn’t get a chance to look at these readings specifically, but now that I have, I find myself a little confused with the way Foucault defines power. I understand we only read a small portion about it, but I feel as though he predominantly spoke about what power is not, and I find myself not really clear about what it really is (and especially unclear about what definition should be applied to power in Western Society today).
Foucault resists defining power as being exerted by one group over another, and chooses to exclude the definition of power as being exerted by “...a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state” (Sexuality 92). Unfortunately for me, I find that these two explanations best explain the presence of body image in our society, and the reasons for why there are so many struggles that result from it.
As I mentioned, Foucault talks about destiny and how it is determined by the extent to which we choose to follow the truths dictated by power. If society dictates how we should look, act, and feel (which is does), we have no choice but to follow the truth in order to avoid “death” (as Foucault so bluntly puts it). Who creates these truths, who sustains them, and who enforces them? In the case of body image, it is the predominantly (in my opinion) the mass media. We are forced to abide by its guidelines in order to avoid social suicide.
Although not required in our readings for this week, on page 140 of The History of Sexuality, Foucault talks about bio-power and the “...diverse techniques for the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations...” The mass media is one of many institutions that attempt to exert control over specific populations by portraying different types of lifestyles and the consequences that go along with living them. The mass media produces images of how we should comport ourselves, and forces us to be concerned about our position in society. Unfortunately, we find ourselves going to great lengths to avoid “death.” The extents people go to in order to reach a desired status in society are often dangerous and sometimes impossible. Are the modes of life that Foucault considers “living,” happy and healthy, and are they in fact even obtainable?
The serial late blogger strikes again. March Break, you know. Killer. But I didn’t want to remain silent this week, because ruminating on effects and origins is one of my favourite things to do!
ReplyDeleteTo start, I am probably spending too much time thinking about Foucault’s nifty rhetorical trick in Lecture One, but the little details count. He begins with a self-deprecating kind of introduction, claiming that his work to date has been an “indecipherable, disorganized muddle” (Power/Knowledge, p. 78) that, due to its repetitiveness, “perhaps says nothing” (p. 78). By moving to a careful explanation of the “efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives” (p. 80)— which, of course, describes his own “fragments” that he hopes others will pick up and develop (p. 79)—Foucault obliquely rescues his own work from the academic dustbin. He is then able to seamlessly integrate his own “fragments of research” (p. 85) into the framework of genealogy (p. 86). Well done. What really caught my attention, however, was this claim about his research: “None of it does more than mark time” (p. 78). While easily interpreted (in the context of the self-deprecating introduction) as a “waste of time,” I sense that “marking time” has another, more positive or generative meaning that is better reinterpreted with the strength of fragmentariness in mind. Might marking time be a way of signaling what is discontinuous rather than linear? And if so, is that signal an effect or a cause? As in, must one be already aware of a pre-existing discontinuity and claim a space (or time) from which to announce it…or does the mark (or proclamation) itself interrupt linearity? And, most importantly, why would I feel the need to describe this all in terms of a false binary?
Such thinking leads me to “articulation,” and I’m so glad you mentioned the concept in your post, Carolyn. I had noticed Foucault’s use of the term when he describes his third methodological preoccupation in discussing power. He claims that his work has carefully avoided claiming a singular domination; rather, he argues that individuals are part of a web of power (P/K, p. 98). In this formulation, no one space is determined: any person could occupy a subject position anywhere. And no one space is dominant: all are “always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power” (p. 98). This is where articulation comes in: “They [the subjects in the web] are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation” (p. 98). The “element” here is both an effect and, only insofar as it is effect, a vehicle of power. As I read Slack’s (and others’) elucidations of articulation, the process has a fascinating chicken-and-egg iteration, whereby the term denotes a simultaneous explication and formation of connections. This is such a (gorgeous) mind-boggling consideration of origins. Because, as Haraway taught us this term, knowledge can only be situated; one must be located to make a claim. But what if positionality can be understood as preceding a claim only insofar as it is understood as a product of those very claims? This quandary is, perhaps, the hydraulic of truth production and power that Foucault names the “economy of discourses of truth” (P/K, p. 93) and that Max points out in his posting. Claims (truth production) as exercises of an identity (power) that locates, controls, and produces claims (truth)... I do so love endless regression.
I’m not sure where this leaves me in terms of considering Carolyn’s question about identity and subjectivity, but I do know that it is such a powerful reminder of what is probably the most perilous and pervasive thought pattern I can conjure: confusing effects for origins.